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7 July 1960

MEMO FOR	25X1A9a					
SUBJECT:	Objections to	IG	Report	on	NE	Division
	25X1A9a					

s memo and am jotting down some 1. I have re-read comments which you might consider before we see Kirk.

2. First, I am sineerely serry that the has reacted emotionally 25X1A9a to what we tried to make an objective and fairly formal report. I think it would have been smarter for to answer our comments on the same basis on which we made them, avoiding a personal memo to the DCI. I feel strongly that we should NOT get involved in a personal-channel memorandum writing 25X1A9a I would urge Kirk not to answer in writing. If contest with he honestly wanted explanations of anything we wrote, he could easily have asked us to come over. At this point I think mand is closed, and 25X1A9a I see no advantage to re-stating our contentions over his objections.

3. I believe honestly thought he was running the best division in the Agency, and was hurt personally when he got a report that showed otherwise. The key to the matter may be in a couple of statements from 25X1A9a memo. In Para 3 he writes that "Neither I nor the other officers of this Division want or expect to receive kudos in an IG report, which is properly devoted to identifying areas where improvements can be made ... " (underlines added). Despite this disclaimer, in the same paragraph he complains that "It is exceedingly difficult to find words of commendation /in the IG report/"
Summing up in his last paragraph, accuses the IG of injustice for his 25X1A9a "failure to give the minimum of credit where credit is due..."

4. In Para 2 says that personally he objects "not as much on what is said as on the manner in which it is said ... " Again, in the final paragraph he objects to the "general tone" of the IG report. However, memo contains not one example of impropriety of tone in the IG report, nor does he cite any word, parase, or sentence which says anything in a disparaging or supercilious way. On the contrary, every specific objection raised by is to a question of fact or opinion. Nowhere does he specifically question the way we expressed ourselves. 25X1A9a

quotes three sub-paragraphs from the IG report 5. In Para 4 and then, in his words, takes the strongest possible issue with them. The question is whether is accessible to what we called "the working level" and what the interprets to mean chiefly branch chiefs. Contradicts himself in this paragraph. In one sentence he admits that "I do have to mpend quite a bit of time in meetings outside the building ... " while in another sentence he claims that "I am accessible at all times to the Branch Chiefs..." We must not try to argue this question on the basis of either timetables or semantics. The plain fact is that some of the branch chiefs and many of the GS-12 level case officers told us they had trouble seeing

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6. In Para 5 quotes our statement that NE people frequently must rely on tentative policy guidance from officers who are not of division 25X1A9a chief stature. He interprets this as an attack on In this he is wrong. I think what we were trying to say was that because ordinary case officers could not easily approach the division chief they often relied on tentative (but unauthoritative) guidance from section, unit, branch, or staff chiefs. For example, the FI Staff chief was engaged in giving guidance most of the time --- yet more did not list him among those 25X1A9a "points of decision" entitled to give out the approved policy.

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completely misses the point in our suggestions for reorganization. What we wanted was to have genuine authority delegated to the branch chiefs. It insists that he does delegate authority — but the branch chiefs still cannot even release a cable. unconsciously reveals his own view of branch chiefs at the end of Para 7, where he explains that he had 25X1A9a considered reorganizing the branches and giving them more authority, but could not do so because "it would have involved the up-grading of positions for the Branch Chiefs, and the identification and assignment of very highly qualified and experienced personnel to take over the positions." By implication, with is saying that his present branch chiefs are not "very highly qualified and experienced personnel." 25X1A9a

8. In Para 8 defends his unilateral operations as adequate.
This is a matter of opinion. In any case, and does not say we were wrong; 25X1A9a he just says he's doing as well as he can. I still think we should do better.

9. In Paras 9 and 10 disagrees with our recommendations that 25X1A6a he cut He is, of course, defending his own slots, his own budget and his own decisions. I am sorry he was not more objective and I hope someone will weigh costs against results before discarding our suggestions.

10. In general, I think memo is rather childish and I hope we don't have to answer it in kind. I would prefer to ignore it completely, but if we must answer I would suggest one sentence saying we are sorry 25X1A9a interpreted the report as a personal attack and hope he will not let his feeling about the "tone" of the report interfere with careful consideration of the recommendations. 25X1A9a

memo is dated 10 June. How come we didn't 11. Incidentally, get our copy until 6 July? 25X1A9a



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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kirkpatrick

Subject: Memo from Chief, NE Division, re the IG Survey of the Division

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1. I believe that memorandum is a very good analysis of the subject document, and I would like to add only one or two points.

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- refers to our statement that no one 2. In paragraph 2, in the Division could be considered an expert on the whole area, and only a handful are expert on any one country. He states that this is untrue in both particulars. I would like to point out that our statement did not reflect our own judgement but rather the judgement of the Division itself. We asked most of the senior officers who they considered to be the Division's area experts. There were no nominations except in one instance. One individual stated that he regarded himself as an expert on South Asia and that another officer was an expert on the He acknowledged, however, that m neither of them could speak a Near Eastern language and that they had little knowledge of the social, economic, and religious problems of the area. Further, the purpose of the statement was not to demonstrate that the officers of the Division were incompetent, but only that they had a limited interest in making a career in NE. 25X1A9a
- 3. In paragraph 4 comments on our statements that he had many outside calls on his time. In this connection I might note that his three immediate assistants all pointed out that he was away much of the time and that they had to "run the store".
- 4. As one last point, there is some affection to the fact that we did not give credit where credit was due. In one instance we recommended a commendation for a station chief. In both that the facilities were in excellent hands. In the commended the 25X1A6a COS for an excellent job under very trying conditions. In the we 25X1A6a stated that the Deputy Chief was doing his utmost to reshape the station's activities. These come to mind without a review of the report, and I am certain that there are other instances.

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